r T^H E Commonwealth government's forthcoming proposals to reform Austra lia's taxation system could well include the introduction of a goods and JL . services tax (GST). This would be a broad-based consumption tax diat may eidier be hidden in the price of goods or, as in Canada, added on explicitly at the point of sale.
Political considerations are likely to play a major role in the choice of modifica tions to specific taxes. For example, voters may be concerned only with the total tax paid, along with the total amount of government services provided (and, possibly, associated changes in government debt if revenues and expenditures do not bal ance). In this case, tax reform that increases the efficiency of the tax system and is revenue-neutral, as the government of Canada claimed of its GST when it was in troduced in 1991, should not affect the government's electoral chances. However, if voters do not treat all types of taxes as being indistinguishable, then there are dif ferent political costs associated with alternative types of taxes and these may differ substantially from the economic costs of these taxes. To the extent that different forms of taxes affect voters differently, governments may choose those tax instru ments which have lower political costs rather than those that have lower economic costs. As noted by Hettich and Winer (1984) , the politically optimal tax structure is one in which die marginal political cost, radier dian die marginal economic cost, of raising an addidonal dollar of tax revenue is the same for all types of taxes.
Different types of taxes might be expected to have different effects on vodng behaviour, and hence on die polidcal success of die incumbent party, for several reasons. For example, some taxes may be difficult to perceive because diey arc hidden in prices (excise taxes) or deducted at source (corporate taxes, resource rent taxes), so that die voters are unaware of die true size of die tax burden. Odier taxes may be reladvely small and paid only infrequendy (licence fees), while odiers may
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continually reinforce the voter's perception of the tax (sales taxes, especially those added explicidy at the point of sale). Furthermore, the costs of taxes may be dis tributed unevenly across the electorate, and this distribution may differ for different types of taxes. Since the political costs of taxes may differ, and these differences may affect the types of taxes chosen, political costs may have a significant impact on the tax structure and, in particular, on whether a tax such as a GST is adopted in Australia.
In this article, the relative political costs of different types of taxes are evaluated empirically, with particular attention being paid to a visible GST-type tax. Unfortu nately, this type of analysis is not feasible using Australian data because there does not exist in Australia, at either the State or federal level, a tax which is similar to a visible GST. Further, even an evaluation of the political costs of the hidden federal sales tax is not possible given the small num ber of post-war federal elections (and, thus, observations) . W hile there have been a larger number of State elections dur ing this period, no equivalent State-level tax exists.
Given the absence of relevant Australian data, the political costs of different taxes are evaluated here using data for Canada. Canada's GST is a federal tax that was introduced at the beginning of 1991. As there have been only two Canadian federal elections since that time, and no variation in the GST tax rate, sufficient Ca nadian federal data do not exist to evaluate the political costs of this tax. However, all Canadian provinces except one have for some time levied visible sales taxes. Like the Canadian GST, diese sales taxes are explicidy added to die purchase price at the point of sale and, therefore, might be expected to have similar political impli cations as die GST. In addition, diese taxes have varied in size across provinces and through time, and data are available for a relatively large number of Canadian provincial elections. As a result, the evaluation of die political costs of a visible GST-type sales tax presented here is based on results obtained using data on Ca nadian provincial-level taxes and elections. However, it should be noted that the results obtained will reflect die impact of a change in existing tax rates rather than the introduction of a new sales tax.
Since a sales tax is an alternative to other types of taxes, in order to determine die relative political cost of sales taxes it is also necessary to evaluate die costs of odier forms of taxes. Hence, in addition to sales taxes, in die analysis diat follows we consider the (potentially) distinct effects on political success of direct taxes on persons, direct taxes on businesses or corporations, property taxes, taxes on fuel or specific natural resources, and licence or permit fees. Furdier, since the political success of an incumbent party will depend on die services the government provides as well as die taxes it levies, it is also necessary to evaluate the political costs and benefits of different types of expenditures. T he alternative government expenditure instruments to be considered include government purchases of goods and services as well as transfers from government to persons, transfers to businesses (subsidies and capital assistance are considered separately), transfers to other levels of gov ernm ent, and transfers to hospitals.
Modelling Voting Behaviour
Since the political cost of a particular fiscal policy depends on its impact on voting behaviour, an empirical analysis of political costs must begin with the specification of a model of voting behaviour. Voting can be viewed as a process in which each voter votes for die political party which, if elected, is expected to make him or her better off than any other political party, in die light of the voter's forecasts ol what changes will occur if that party is elected and of how, and to what extent, the voter will be affected by these changes. Following Deacon and Shapiro (1975) , our analysis is based on an economic model of vodng behaviour in which voters focus on expected changes in their gross income as well as on expected changes in various types of taxes and government expenditures and in the level of government debt.
According to this model, voters consider what policies they expect, and hence how well off they are likely to be, if the incumbent party is re-elected, and then de cide whether or not to vote for that party. They use informadon on how the in cumbent party has performed since the last elecdon as a signal of die incumbent's future performance. In pardcular, diey base their decisions on the changes since die previous elecdon in various types of taxes and government spending, as well as in the level of government debt and gross income.
Voters have access to addidonal informadon which may signal an incumbent's future behaviour, and which may, dierefore, have a systemadc effect on die prob ability diat a voter will vote for die incumbent party. This informadon may include variables reflecdng die incumbent's overall economic performance, such as changes in die unemployment rate, as well as odier variables that reflect pardcular characterisdcs of die incumbent party, such as years in office.
Modelling Political Costs
The polidcal cost (or benefit) of die acdons taken by a polidcal party can be meas ured in terms of die impact of these actions on die objecdves of the party. Accord ing to Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1973) , the goal of candidates and of pardes is to win elecdons. While Downs equates winning elecdons with maximis ing votes, Riker and Ordeshook provide four different interpretations of winning, implying four corresponding possible objecdves for polidcal parties and candidates: maximising their plurality; maximising die number of votes received; maximising die proportion of votes received; and maximising die probability of winning. Widi a first-past-die-post electoral system, as used in Canada, a party's proportion of seats and its proportion of votes may differ significandy.
Neverdieless, empirical models of voter behaviour have tended to concentrate on explaining die percentage of die vote received (Deacon & Shapiro, 1975; Peltz- man, 1990, 1992) , perhaps in part because this measure is thought to utilise more information than whether a party simply won or lost. However, except in single jurisdiction two-alternative contests, a party's vote percentage (like its number of votes or percentage of seats) does not generally imply anything about victory or de feat. A more important reason for concentrating on the vote percentage is that a political party which is interested in maximising die probability that it will obtain the vote of a randomly chosen voter can be viewed as if it is maximising its percentage of die vote (Deacon & Shapiro, 1975) . In this context, the marginal polidcal costs of pardcular fiscal policies can be defined as the effect on diis vote percentage (that is, on die probability diat a randomly chosen voter will vote for die party) of changes in various taxes and expenditures.
In terms of evaluadng polidcal costs, however, it may be more useful to view a polidcal party's objecdve as being maximisadon of its probability of victory rather than maximisadon of its percentage of die vote. There are several reasons for this, but the most important for present purposes is that, when die objecdve is defined as the maximisadon of die number (or percentage) of votes, the preferences of all vot ers, including decisive voters as well as voters in marginal non-decisive groups, are given equal weight. Assuming diat the objecdve of a party is polidcal victory, the appropriate measure of the polidcal cost (or benefit) of a policy is its effect on the probability of victory, in which case the preferences of decisive voters are weighted more heavily dian die preferences of marginal voters. Indeed, a polidcal party diat is interested in maximising die probability of victory can be viewed as if it is maxi mising die probability diat it will receive die vote of die decisive voter.
In view of diese consideradons, in die empirical analysis reported here die po lidcal costs of pardcular types of taxes and government expenditures are evaluated in terms of dieir effect on bodi die percentage of the vote (where die objecdve is to obtain die vote of a random voter) and die probability of winning (where die focus is on die vote of die decisive voter). As a result, two different equations are esdmated: one describing die percentage of die vote won by the opposidon and the odicr describing die elccdon outcome (where 0 indicates incumbent victory and 1 indicates incumbent defeat). In order to examine the impact of different types of taxes and government expenditures on each of diese measures of polidcal success, in bodi cases die explanatory variables include changes in various types of taxes, transfer payments and government spending, as well as changes in income and in die government debt. Addidonal variables which may signal die incumbent's future behaviour (which are described more fully below) are also included as explanatory variables in bodi equadons.
While policies that voters believe to be beneficial are likely to increase both the vote percentage and die probability of winning, die different weights attached to the preferences of decisive and non-decisive voters by die two objeedves may cause significant differences in die quantitative measures of the political costs of these policies. A comparison of the empirical results obtained under each ol diese two alternative political objectives may indicate the importance of correcdy identifying the government's objective when attempting to evaluate die political costs of changes in its fiscal program.
Application to Canadian Provincial Data
The economic data used to generate die explanatory variables required to estimate die equations of percentage vote and probability of incumbent defeat are taken from Canada's annual provincial national accounts for die years 1961-90 inclusive. During diis period diere were 82 provincial elections in Canada's ten provinces, aldiough one election in die province of Newfoundland (in March 1972) occurred less dian five months alter die preceding election and was omitted since it could not be separately associated widi annual economic data. These provincial elections, which follow no particular timetable, were matched widi annual economic data by associating die previous year's data widi an election which took place on or before 30 June, and data from die current year widi elections diat occurred on or alter 1 July. In view of die differences in the size of government across provinces and die sample period, and since elections do not occur at specified intervals, variables were normalised by dividing by the level of real provincial per-capita GDP for die elec tion year, and were converted into average annual changes since die last election. Since die data refer to changes between elections, die 81 included elections yielded 71 useable observ ations.
Relatively minor aggregation of expenditure and tax categories left data available for die real annual per-capita change (since die previous election) in the revenue obtained from eight different types of taxes: direct taxes on persons, corporate taxes, gasoline taxes, natural resource taxes, sales taxes, miscellaneous indirect taxes, licences, permits and other lees, and die provincial property tax; and in six types of government spending and transfers: expenditure on goods and services, transfers to persons, transfers to business (subsidies), transfers to business (capital assistance), transfers to local government, and transfers to hospitals.
As noted above, additional variables which may signal die future behaviour of die incumbent are also included in die empirical specification. The change between elections in die provincial unemployment rate is used as a possible signal of the in cumbent's overall economic policy success. Since voters might believe diat dieir well-being depends on whether die incumbent party can cooperate widi or counter balance die federal government, a dummy variable is included to reflect whether the incumbent provincial party was die same as die governing national party. As well, since a new leader might not be held responsible by voters for past actions of die government, we include a dummy variable which indicates if die incumbent party changed leaders wiüiin die twelve months prior to die election. Finally, two addi tional variables -die number of years diat die incumbent party has held office, and diis value squared -are included since voters may perceive the incumbent party to be more alienated from die public die longer it is in power, and this per ception may not grow at a constant rate.
Note diat since monetary policy is a federal responsibility, and is taken as given by voters in provincial elections, inflation is not included as an explanatory variable. While inflation may have an effect on taxes paid if die tax system is not inflation neutral, these effects should be accounted for by die use here of tax revenues rather dian tax rates.
Empirical Findings
As explained in die preceding sections, die political costs of different taxes are de termined by estimating two equations, one describing die percentage of the vote received by die opposition, and the other describing whedier die opposition won or lost die election. The opposition's percentage of die vote ranges between 37.35 per cent and 80.35 per cent over the 71 different elections, with an average value of 54.49 per cent. Thus, on average, die probability that a randomly chosen voter would vote for the opposition was almost 0.55. However, die opposition won only 24 of die 71 elections, so diat die probability diat die decisive voter would vote for die opposition (in which case die incumbent would lose) was only 0.34. Hence, differences might be expected in die results obtained widi die two estimating equa tions.
As indicated by die results presented in Table 1 , die only tax variables diat have a statistically significant impact on political success in bodi estimating equations are sales taxes and licences, permits and odier fees. Increases in sales taxes reduce bodi die incumbent's vote percentage and probability of winning, while increases in li cences, permits and odier fees improve bodi these measures of the incumbent's political success. In addition, based on die estimates for die equation describing the probability of incumbent defeat, bodi increases in direct taxes on persons and in creases in gasoline taxes significandy improve die opposition's electoral chances. A test of whedier all die tax variables have die same marginal impact on the incum bent's political success (diat is, whedier diey all have die same marginal political costs) indicates diat die effects of die different taxes are statistically significandy dif ferent.
The only type of government spending diat significandy improves the incum bent's electoral position is spending on goods and services. Odier types of govern ment expenditure eidier have no significant effect or actually significandy assist the opposition's electoral position, particularly transfers to persons and to local gov ernment (in bodi models) as well as business subsidies (only in die probability of incumbent defeat equation).
As for die odier variables included in die estimating equations, increases in percapita provincial debt decrease die incumbent's vote percentage, but have an insig nificant effect on die probability diat die incumbent will lose. This suggests that decisive voters misjudge the future budget consequences of current spending and taxation policies, or they have sufficiently high discount rates or, in the context of provincial elections, they believe that they can avoid future taxes by moving to an other province. Increases in real per-capita income tend to raise the incumbent's vote percentage and probability of victory, but not significantly. Although not re ported in Table 1 , die empirical results also indicate that, as its term in office lengthens, die percentage vote for die incumbent as well as its probability of victory decrease. In addition, diere is a significant increase in die incumbent's vote per centage, but not probability of winning, if bodi die provincial and die federal gov ernments are from die same party. However, neidier of die odicr variables (die change in die unemployment rate and a variable reflecdng a change in leaders for die incumbent party prior to the elecdon) is found to have a significant effect on eidier measure of electoral success. The main difference between die results for die two objective functions is that die effects of the different types of taxes and expenditures on the probability of vic tory tend to be larger and are estimated more precisely (that is, more coefficients are statistically significant and they tend to be significant at a higher level of confi-cience) than are their effects on the vote percentage. This difference may arise be cause, in the probability of winning formulation, the estimated effects reflect the preferences of decisive voters, while in the vote percentage formulation they reflect the preferences of all voters, including those on the fringes of the political spectrum. Indeed, differences in the significance of the tax and expenditure effects in the two formulations imply that the preferences of voters as a whole differ much more sig nificantly across provinces and elections than do the preferences of decisive voters.
The Magnitude of Marginal Political Costs
Numerical estimates of the marginal political costs of each tax and type of govern ment spending are presented in Table 1 for both political cost models. These esti mates reflect the impact of a one-dollar increase in each of these variables on either the vote percentage of the opposition or the probability that the opposition will win the election. Since the magnitudes of diese effects differ from election to election, the values presented in Table 1 are averages over the 71 observations (elections). These results indicate that a one-dollar increase in per-capita revenue from the visible sales tax would reduce die incumbent's vote percentage by 0.0017 and re duce die incumbent's probability of winning by 0.0052. This latter effect is smaller dian die impact of an increase in die gasoline tax on the probability of defeat (the gasoline tax has an insignificant effect on the percentage of die vote), but larger than die impact of an increase in direct taxes on persons (which also has an insignificant effect on the vote percentage). Note, in addition, that increased debt financing has an insignificant effect on die probability of defeat, aldiough it has a significandy negadve effect on die incumbent's vote percentage. Thus, debt financing (at least undl taxes must be raised to meet interest and principal payments) may be pre ferred over sales taxes by die incumbent party.
While the magnitudes of die esdmated effects associated widi corporate taxes, natural resource taxes, miscellaneous indirect taxes, and the provincial property tax are large in some instances, diese effects are not statistically significant. Thus, while diese taxes may have had a large impact on some elecdons, diey have not had a systemadc effect across elecdons.
In contrast to visible sales taxes which have a reladvely large polidcal cost, in creases in licences, permits and odicr fees provide a large marginal polidcal benefit to die incumbent, widi die magnitude of diis effect dwarfing diat of any odier tax (or expenditure). Unlike odier taxes, diese fees tend to be service specific, and voters may see diem as resulting in better service (such as shorter queues). In addition, die average voter may not use many of die services funded by these fees and so may prefer that diey be financed on a user-pay basis radier dian out of general revenues.
In terms of die effects of die various expenditure variables, expenditure on goods and services would increase the incumbent's percentage of die vote by 0.0006 and the incumbent's probability of winning by 0.004. In contrast, transfers to local government would decrease dieir vote percentage by 0.0012 and dieir probability ol winning by 0.0062. While no odier expenditure variables have significant effects in the vote percentage equation, in the probability of winning equation the largest sig-nificarit effect on the incumbent party's success is associated with transfers to busi ness, which decrease the probability of victory by 0.0093.
Political Expediency vs the Economic Efficiency of Different Taxes
It has often been noted that political decisions do not necessarily correspond to the types of decisions that could be justified on purely economic grounds. Although the analysis here has concentrated on die political costs of different types of taxes (and government expenditures), there is a considerable literature concerning the economic cost or efficiency of alternative forms of taxation. A comparison of the political cost estimates obtained here with information about the economic costs of these different types of taxes may provide some indication of the extent to which economic and political tax-choice decisions are likely to coincide. It may also pro vide an indication of whether political and economic arguments are likely to corre spond or diverge in die debate on tax reform in Australia.
In a study of die marginal efficiency costs of various US taxes, Jorgenson and Yun (1991) found diat corporate taxes were die least efficient, followed in order of increasing efficiency by individual income taxes, sales taxes, and property taxes. In the empirical work reported here, corporate taxes and property taxes, die two taxes at die opposite ends of diis list, are found to have stadsdcally insignificant effects, indicating diat the marginal polidcal costs of these two tax instruments are stadsd cally indisdnguishable. However, sales taxes are found here to have a higher mar ginal polidcal cost dian direct taxes, so that die esdmated polidcal cost ranking of these two taxadon instruments is the reverse of dieir efficiency cost ranking. Thus, to the extent diat die efficiency ranking of tax instruments in die US is applicable more generally, die marginal polidcal cost esdmates provided here indicate that governments that wish to reduce die polidcal costs of generadng revenue may not choose taxes diat are the most appropriate from die point of view of economic effi ciency.
Predictions of Vote Percentages and Election Outcomes
In common widi most economic models, die results reported here rely on empiri cal specificadons diat embody a number of assumpdons. For example, in the specified models it is assumed diat voters make electoral choices based on eco nomic factors which include lagged changes in income, disaggregated tax revenues, disaggregated government spending, and government debt. While die assumpdons embedded in the esdmated models are not direedy testable, one way of assessing die overall usefulness of die modelling approach employed here (as opposed to, say, an approach in which vodng depends more on sociological or psychological factors) is to compare die predictions of die models widi observed election out comes. To provide a more stringent assessment of die predictive ability of the models, predictions are made for elections that are not included in die sample used to estimate die two models. To diis end, the models are re-estimated widi data from die last seven provincial elections (each for a different province) omitted.
Based on these revised estimates, predictions of the incumbent's vote percentage, and of the election outcome (based on predictions of the probability that the in cumbent will lose) are made for each of the seven omitted elections. Following conventional practice (Greene, 1993:651-2) , values of the probability of losing that exceed 0.5 are viewed as indicating that the incumbent will lose. Note: Based on the prediction that the incumbent will lose if its probability of defeat ex ceeds 0.5, a t indicates that the model correctly predicted the election result. Table 2 lists the province and month of the seven elections for which predic tions are made, along with the actual incumbent vote percentage and the result of the election. The predictions of the probability of defeat for the incumbent are al ways less than 0.5 in the five cases where the incumbent won (and in two of these cases the predicted probabilities are almost zero), and above 0.5 (in fact above 0.9) in both cases in which the incumbent lost. Thus, the actual election result is cor rectly predicted in all seven cases. Estimates of die incumbent's vote percentage provide no direct prediction of die elecdon result, and thus cannot be evaluated on die basis of actual elecdon outcomes. However, based on die reladvely low pre dicted incumbent vote percentage in die provinces of Alberta (36.6 per cent) and Prince Edward Island (42.0 per cent), one might have expected diese governments to be defeated when diey were actually re-elected. Along widi die relatively impre cise coefficient estimates associated widi die percentage vote model, diese predicdon results suggest diat die probability of defeat model might be preferred to die vote percentage formuladon.
Conclusion
The introduedon of a GST-type visible sales tax is being considered as part of the current discussion on tax reform in Australia. Using Canadian provincial-level data, in conjuncdon with an economic model of vodng behaviour, we obtain esdmates of the impact on die success of die incumbent party of changes in a visible sales tax as well as die impact of changes in other forms of taxes and government expenditures.
The model performs well, in terms of both the significance of coefficients and its predictive power, especially when the objective of political parties is taken to be the maximisation of the probability of victory. This suggests that the framework em ployed here is a useful way of evaluating the political costs and benefits of different fiscal policies.
W hether the objective of the incumbent party is to maximise its percentage of die vote or its probability of victory, increases in visible sales taxes are found to have a significandy negadve effect on the incumbent party's success. The effect of a sales tax increase on die probability of defeat is smaller in magnitude than an increase in the gasoline tax, but larger dian the effect of an increase in direct taxes on persons (both of which are, at least to some extent, visible taxes). Less visible taxes, such as corporate taxes, natural resource taxes, and other indirect taxes, are shown to have a stadstically insignificant impact on die incumbent party's success. The significandy positive impact of licence and other fees on the incumbent's political success sug gests a distinct voter preference for user-pay methods of financing publicly provided goods.
Government spending on goods and services is the only type of spending that significandy reduces the probability of incumbent defeat and the opposition's vote percentage, while increased transfers to individuals, businesses or local governments have eidier a neutral or a detrimental impact (from the point of view of the incum bent). These results suggest diat governments could maximise dieir political success by increasing spending on goods and services and reducing transfers to individuals, local governments and businesses. While an increase in die level of government debt appears to cause a very small but significant reduction in the incumbent's per centage of die vote, it does not have a significant effect on die probability of incum bent defeat. As a result, governments may prefer issuing debt radier dian raising taxes in order to cover short-term revenue shortfalls.
Based on die results presented here, it would appear that governments wishing to improve dieir electoral chances are likely to reduce their reliance on broad-based visible taxes such as sales taxes, gasoline taxes and income taxes, and concentrate instead on raising revenue from less visible revenue sources such as natural re source royalties, corporate taxes, and user fees. Since die largest political costs are associated widi die most visible taxes and, in particular, widi a type of sales tax which is very similar to a visible GST, diese results may have important implications for tax reform in Australia. A federal sales tax of diis type was introduced in Can ada in 1991 and became a major election issue during die 1993 Canadian federal election. In fact, die opposition party's promise to replace this tax, a major plank of its campaign, was probably one of die reasons it won a majority (although this promise was not kept during its first term in office). In contrast, die party which introduced die GST went from holding a majority of die seats in the Canadian par liament to holding just two of 295 federal seats.
Even diough a visible GST-type tax can be supported on efficiency grounds, die associated political costs, as evidenced by die results reported here and die 1993 Canadian federal election, may be sufficiendy large to make its introduction politi-cally unappealing. Indeed, the results presented above suggest that governments considering tax reform may tend to concentrate on increasing taxes which are less visible or increasing user fees, since these are the least politically costly policies. Alternatively, if a GST is introduced, the results here suggest that this tax may be politically less costly if it is included in the price rather than added on explicitly at the point of sale. Despite the political appeal of taxes which are less visible or a hidden GST, tax reform that concentrates on these types of taxes is unlikely to be desirable either on efficiency grounds or in terms of promoting government ac countability.
